Abstract-In an open environment such as the Internet, the decision to collaborate with a stranger (e.g., by granting access to a resource) is often based on the characteristics (rather than the identity) of the requester, via digital credentials: Access is granted if Alice's credentials satisfy Bob's access policy. The literature contains many scenarios in which it is desirable to carry out such trust negotiations in a privacy-preserving manner, i.e., so as minimize the disclosure of credentials and/or of access policies. Elegant solutions were proposed for achieving various degrees of privacy-preservation through minimal disclosure. In this paper, we present protocols that protect both sensitive credentials and sensitive policies. That is, Alice gets the resource only if she satisfies the policy, Bob does not learn anything about Alice's credentials (not even whether Alice got access), and Alice learns neither Bob's policy structure nor which credentials caused her to gain access. Our protocols are efficient in terms of communication and in rounds of interaction.
Ç

INTRODUCTION
W HEREAS, in the past, access decisions were based on the identity of the entity requesting a resource, in open systems such as the Internet, this approach is ineffective when the resource owner and the requester belong to different security domains controlled by different authorities that are unknown to each other. One alternative is to use digital credentials for satisfying access policies. Digital credentials, the digital equivalent of paper credentials, are digitally signed assertions about the credential owner by a credential issuer. Each digital credential contains an attribute (or set of attributes) about the owner. The decision to allow or deny access to a resource is based on the attributes in the requester's credentials, such as age, citizenship, employment, group membership, or credit status. This approach is called attribute-based access control [3] , [27] , [12] , [22] , [21] .
A typical scenario for accessing a resource using digital credentials is for the requester Alice to send her request to Bob, who responds with the policy that governs access to that resource. If Alice's credentials satisfy Bob's policy, she sends the appropriate credentials to Bob. After Bob receives the credentials and verifies them, he grants Alice access to the resource. Observe that, in this scenario, Alice learns Bob's policy and Bob learns Alice's credentials. Such a strategy is straightforward and efficient; however, if the credentials or the access control policies are sensitive, then this strategy is unacceptable. We now give a simple example where both the credentials and the policy are sensitive.
Example 1.
Consider an online business that grants access to media records by sending access keys to its client's special media-reader software-keys that the reader uses to "unlock" encrypted media records that are freely downloaded in encrypted form (or are given away, in encrypted form, on CDs that are widely distributed for free). Certain records are treated differently from the rest: The online business grants access to these records only if the requester has a disability or is a senior citizen or is terminally ill and has an income of under 30 K a year. This requirement involves four attributes (denote them by attr 1 , attr 2 , attr 3 , attr 4 ) and the policy is ðattr 1 _ attr 2 _ attr 3 Þ^attr 4 . In order to gain access to the sensitive records in Bob's database, Alice needs to prove to Bob that she satisfies the policy. However, neither Alice nor Bob is willing to disclose her/his private information. Alice does not want to reveal her credentials as her credentials contain sensitive information about her (e.g., health, age, income, etc.). Bob does not want to reveal the policy, even to those who satisfy the policy, so as to make it harder for an adversary to know which credentials he needs to forge or otherwise illicitly gain access.
In other examples, the motivation for hiding the policy is not security from an evil adversary, but simply the desire to prevent legitimate users from "gaming" the system-e.g., changing their behavior based on their knowledge of the policy (which can render economically motivated policies less effective). This is particularly important for policies that are not incentive-compatible in economic terms (i.e., they suffer from perverse incentives in that they reward the wrong kinds of behavior, such as free-loading). In yet other examples, the policy is simply a commercial secret-e.g., Bob has pioneered a novel way of doing business and knowledge of the policy would compromise Bob's strategy and invite unwelcome imitators.
Finally, it is important to point out that a process that protects Alice's credentials from Bob is ultimately not only to Alice's advantage but also to Bob's: Bob no longer needs to worry about rogue insiders in his organization illicitly leaking or selling Alice's private information and may even lower his liability insurance rates as a result of this. Privacypreservation is a win-win proposition, one that is appealing even if Alice and Bob are honest and trustworthy entities.
Related Work
Our work is related to the area of automated trust negotiation [4] , [28] , [31] , [32] , [33] , [34] , [37] , [38] . The goal of trust negotiation is to enable strangers to access sensitive data in open environments without violating the data's access policy. In trust negotiation, two parties establish trust through iterative disclosure of credentials and requests for credentials. Most of the research in this area focuses on protecting resources and credentials and assumes that policies can be freely disclosed. Some work [4] , [28] , [37] considers access policies to be sensitive information. Bonatti and Samarati [4] proposed a framework for regulating service access and information release on the Web. Their scheme protects the revelation of policies by dividing policies into two parts: service prerequisite rules and service requisite rules. A requisite rule is disclosed only after prerequisite rules are satisfied. Seamons et al. proposed the concept of policy graphs in [28] . Instead of using a single policy, their scheme uses policy graphs to represent complex policies and it protects polices by gradual disclosure of the graph nodes. Furthermore, Yu and Winslett proposed a unified scheme (UniPro) for resource protection [37] . The basic idea of the UniPro scheme is to model policies as protected resources and to protect them in the same way as other resources. Our work offers better protection of policies; in their schemes, Alice learns (part of) the policy if her credentials satisfy the policy, whereas, in our protocols, Alice does not learn the policy even if her access request is granted.
Li et al. introduced the notion of Oblivious SignatureBased Envelope (OSBE) [20] to protect sensitive credentials. They assume the content of a credential is nonsensitive (as anyone can come up with it) and only the signature of the credential needs to be protected. In OSBE, Alice sends Bob the content of her credential or a credential that she does not have and Bob runs an OSBE protocol with Alice, sending an encrypted message to Alice such that Alice can decrypt it if and only if she has the signature on the content. The difference between their work and ours is that the policies in OSBE have to be revealed, whereas the policies in our protocols are protected.
Balfanz et al. proposed a construct called secret handshakes [1] . In their scheme, each party receives, from a central authority, a certificate that consists of a pseudonym and a corresponding secret. When Alice and Bob meet, they exchange their pseudonyms and then each of them computes a key based on their own secret and the other party's pseudonym in order to achieve mutual authentication.
Compared to their scheme, our work supports more complex policies and protects the content of the policies.
Recently, Holt et al. proposed hidden credentials [18] , a system that protects sensitive credentials and policies. Furthermore, their system reduces the network overhead as it needs fewer rounds of interaction compared to traditional trust negotiation. Their system also solves the "going first" problem in PKI-authentication systems, where one of the two parties must be the first to reveal a certificate to a potentially malicious stranger. Our protocols directly build on their work. However, we believe that the protection of policies in their system is not sufficient, for three reasons: [6] extended the hidden credentials system to support complex access policies expressed as monotonic Boolean functions. They applied a secret splitting system to conceal the structure of such policies. The extended hidden credentials system protects the structure of Bob's polices; however, it is still unable to solve the problems described above in items 2 and 3, whereas, in our protocols, if Alice's credentials match an attribute in Bob's policy, she will not necessarily learn that the attribute is part of the policy (of course, Alice will learn whether she obtained access and some inferences can be made about the attributes in Bob's policy; we will discuss this in more detail in the next section). In summary, the hidden credentials system [18] , [6] and the trust negotiation systems ( [33] , [31] , [38] , [37] , to list a few) do not achieve the privacy goal of our work. Of course, we do so at a cost in protocol complexity; therefore, our work should be viewed as providing another point on the privacy-performance curve, rather than as an unqualified improvement over the previous work.
Problem Definition
Before we formally define the hidden policies with hidden credentials problem, we first define attributes and policies for our problem.
An attribute is a statement about a credential holder. For example, an attribute could be gender (male or female), job type (student, faculty, FBI agent, etc.), state of residence (California, Indiana, Ohio, etc.), status (secret clearance, disabled, homeless), age (between [0-17], between [18] [19] [20] , between , or age ! 60), or annual income (between ½0 À 15K, between ½15K À 30K, between ½30K À 60K, or income > 60K). Let S be the set of all possible attributes in the hidden credentials system. The Certificate Authority (CA) publishes S to every user.
Each credential binds a username nym and an attribute attr. Each user in the system has a unique username nym. nym can be either a real name or a pseudonym. We use cred:attr to denote the attribute associated with the credential cred. If a user has m attributes, she can get m credentials from the CA, one for each attribute. For instance, if Alice is a professor, she can have a professor credential cred 1 , where cred 1 :attr ¼ professor; if her age is 3 0 , s h e h a s a n a g e c r e d e n t i a l cred 2 , where cred 2 :attr ¼ age 2 ½21 . . . 59.
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We now define the policies for our problem. Let P be a family of policy functions. Each P 2 P is a policy function: Given any set of credentials C, P ðCÞ 2 f0; 1g. More specifically, a policy function P is defined by a Boolean expression p that is relevant to n attributes fattr 1 ; attr 2 ; . . . ; attr n g & S.
That is, P ðCÞ ¼ pðx 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x n Þ, where p : f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g
We now give an example to clarify the above definitions. Let C A be Alice's credential set; to check whether Alice satisfies a policy P is equivalent to verifying whether P ðC A Þ ¼ 1. For example, suppose Bob's policy is female^student, i.e., pðx 1 ; x 2 Þ ¼ x 1^x2 , and that Alice has a female credential ðcred 1 :attr ¼ femaleÞ, a professor credential ðcred 2 :attr ¼ professorÞ, and an Indiana resident credential ðcred 3 :attr ¼ IndianaÞ. Alice does not satisfy Bob's policy as P ðcred 1 ; cred 2 ; cred 3 Þ ¼ pðx 1 ; x 2 Þ ¼ 1^0 ¼ 0. Note that x 1 ¼ 1 because Alice has a female credential and x 2 ¼ 0 because Alice does not have a student credential.
The goal of our work is to provide privacy-protection for both access control policies and credentials. The framework for our hidden policies with hidden credentials problem is informally described as follows: Alice has m credentials issued by the CA. Bob has a resource M and a policy P for controlling access to M. When Alice wants to access M from Bob, she engages in a protocol with Bob. Alice provides the protocol with a subset of her credentials (she may choose to omit certain credentials), whereas Bob provides M and the policy P . If the attributes in the credentials that Alice inputs into the protocol satisfy P , she gets M; otherwise, she gets nothing. We want Alice to learn as little information as possible about Bob's policy and Bob to learn as little information as possible about Alice's credentials.
We now formally state the problem. Let M be a private message. Alice has private input C A , a subset of her credentials. Bob has a private message M and a private access control policy P . Alice and Bob want to compute a function F defined as follows:
where F Alice represents Alice's output, F Bob represents Bob's output, and ? denotes an empty message. In other words, our goal is for Bob to learn nothing from the function evaluation, and for Alice to learn F Alice ðC A Þ without learning anything else, i.e., she learns M iff P ðC A Þ is equal to 1 (i.e., her credentials satisfy Bob's policy) and she learns nothing otherwise. Observe that Alice can infer the result of P ðC A Þ from her output. The preceding problem can be solved using general solutions from two-party Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) [36] , [17] , [16] as follows: Alice and Bob first build a universal circuit [30] in which policy evaluation and credential verification are performed and then Alice and Bob securely evaluate the circuit using the standard twoparty SFE techniques [36] , [17] . However, this approach is inefficient, as the size of the circuit is very large.
It is possible in our framework to set the policy to be an arbitrary computable function (even nonmonotonic functions); however, it is common in the literature to assume that the policy does not require the absence of a credential. The reason for this is the practical difficulty of verifying an absence, e.g., if the policy is :attr, then a party, Alice, who has attr can choose not to input the corresponding credential (if she suspects it can cause her to be denied access). Furthermore, if Alice knows that her credentials will not be revealed by the protocol and that the policy is monotonic, then she has an incentive to input all of her credentials. It is therefore a practical consideration, rather than an inherent limitation of our scheme (in fact, our scheme can support nonmonotonic policies), that motivates this assumption that the policy does not require the absence of a credential. Sometimes the absence of a credential ("under 21 years of age") can be replaced by a requirement for the presence of the opposite ("at least 21 years of age"), but this is not always possible (e.g., consider requiring the absence of a credential for millionaire).
Another issue that needs to be discussed is probing attacks by either party. Our protocols prevent Alice from probing a policy offline (i.e., requesting a resource once and then trying several subsets of her credentials). However, Alice can engage in the protocol with Bob multiple times using different credential sets (all subsets of her credentials) to gain information about Bob's policy. Restricting adversaries to online attacks is a significant step forward, but does not entirely solve the problem. Other means for preventing online probing attacks can be taken, for example, making sure that Alice can request a specific resource from Bob no more than three times a week. As Bob does not know whether Alice gained access, he cannot carry out probing attacks.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we give efficient protocols that solve the hidden policies with hidden credential problem. Our protocols are built on the hidden credentials system [18] and have two phases: In the first phase, we use homomorphic encryption, oblivious transfer, scrambled circuit 1. For simplicity, if an attribute takes multiple values such as age and income, we bucket these values into several categories such that it is easier to construct a policy. Consider the policy age ! 21: If we allow age-attribute to be any integer value, then the policy would be age ¼ 21 _ age ¼ 22 _ . . . ; however, if we bucket age-attribute into four groups: ½0 À 18; ½18 À 20; ½21 À 60; ½60þ, the new policy is simply ½21 . . . 59 _ ½60þ.
evaluation, and shuffling to prevent an attacker from offline probing; in the second phase, we use scrambled circuit evaluation to protect the policies.
Our scheme is credential indistinguishable in that the communication between two clients with two credential sets of equal size is indistinguishable (at least to a computationally bounded server) from each other. Thus, the server will not learn which credentials a client has from our protocols. Furthermore, our scheme is policy indistinguishable in that two policies that evaluate to the same value for the client's credential set have indistinguishable communication transcripts and, thus, the client does not learn anything about the policy other than what can be deduced from the outcome (i.e., whether access was granted). For efficiency reasons, we sometimes weaken this latter requirement by requiring only indistinguishability for policies of a certain class (this will become clear in Section 3.2.2).
We provide three protocols, each with different performance and levels of protection for the policy. All of these protocols leak an upper bound on the number of credentials that Alice is using to obtain the resource and an upper bound on the number of attributes in the policy. 2 Protocol 1 reveals to Alice a superset of the credentials in the policy. Protocol 2 reveals the number of credentials in the policy that Alice satisfies. Protocol 3 reveals nothing beyond the above-mentioned upper bounds. Our protocols can support arbitrary policies at exponential cost. However, for certain classes of policies (e.g., monotonic Boolean expression, threshold-based functions), our protocols require only polynomial cost. A summary of our protocols' performance is listed in Table 1. In the above table, is a security parameter and is typically about 1,024 or 2,048. Hence, protocols 1 and 2 are efficient and protocol 3 is quite expensive in practice. Compared to our scheme, the hidden credentials schemes in [18] , [6] require at least OðnÞ communication (depending on the policy structure). Again, we stress that our protocols achieve better privacy at a cost in protocol complexity.
Organization of Document
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the identity-based encryption schemes, the hidden credentials system, and some building blocks that are used in our protocols. We present our protocols in detail in Section 3 and give the security proofs in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
REVIEW OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOOLS
Review of Identity-Based Encryption
The concept of Identity-Base Encryption (IBE) was first proposed by Shamir [29] in 1984; however, the first usable IBE systems were discovered only recently [5] , [9] . An IBE scheme is specified by the following four algorithms:
1. Setup: A Private Key Generator (PKG) takes a security parameter k and generates system parameters params and a master secret s. params is public, whereas s is private to PKG. 2. Extract: Given any arbitrary ID 2 f0; 1g Ã , PKG uses params, s, and ID to compute the corresponding private key d ID . 3. Encrypt: It takes params, ID, and plaintext M as input and returns ciphertext C. 4. Decrypt: It takes params, d ID , and ciphertext C as input and returns the corresponding plaintext M. An IBE scheme enables Bob to encrypt a message using Alice's ID as the public key and, thus, he avoids obtaining the public key from Alice or a directory. Boneh and Franklin proposed an IBE scheme from the Weil pairing [5] that is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks.
Review of Hidden Credentials System
In the hidden credentials system proposed by Holt et al. [18] , there is one or more Credential Authority (CA) who issue credentials for users in the system. We assume CAs are trusted entities. Each user in the system is assigned a unique nym, where nym could be either a real name or a pseudonym. In hidden credential systems [18] , [6] , a credential cred is a tuple (nym, attr, sig). The CA issues a credential asserting that nym has attribute attr by providing sig to the owner of nym. Note that sig is known only to the credential holder (and the CA) and must be kept secret. Given an IBE scheme as described in Section 2.1, the signature sig of a hidden credential cred, for username nym and attribute attr, is the private key corresponding to the identity nym k attr. More specifically, assuming public value params is conventionally agreed upon for use by all CAs, the hidden credentials system has the following four programs:
1. CA CreateðÞ: A CA chooses a private key sk and computes the corresponding public key pk. The CA keeps sk private and publishes pk. The CA may also publish the whole list of attribute names for which she can issue credentials. 2. CA Issueðnym; attrÞ: A CA issues a hidden credential cred for the user with username nym and attribute attr. The signature of the credential cred is the IBE private key corresponding to the public In this table, is a security parameter (e.g., could be the ciphertext size of IBE encryptions [5] , [9] or homomorphic encryptions [11] , [26] , [25] ), m is the number of credentials Alice possesses, and n is the number of attributes in Bob's policy. The simple policies include monotonic Boolean expressions as well as threshold-based functions.
identity nym k attr. Given a hidden credential cred, we use cred:nym to denote the corresponding username, cred:attr to denote the corresponding attribute in the credential, and cred:sig to denote the signature of the credential. 3. IðM; nym k attrÞ: This program corresponds to the encrypt algorithm of the IBE system with system parameters params, ID ¼ nym k attr, and plaintext M. The output of this program is a ciphertext C. 4. I À1 ðC; credÞ: This function corresponds to the decrypt program of the IBE system with system parameters params, credential cred, and ciphertext C. The output of this function is plaintext M. These programs must satisfy the standard consistency constraint, namely, for any credential cred and any message M, I À1 ðIðM; cred:nym k cred:attrÞ; credÞ ¼ M. When a user computes I À1 ðIðM; cred:nym k cred:attrÞ; cred 0 Þ for some cred 0 6 ¼ cred, the value obtained is computationally indistinguishable from a random value. Hidden credentials are secure against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack where an attacker can obtain an unlimited number of other arbitrary credentials [18] . Hidden credentials are also unforgeable [18] . We now give a simple example (based on [18] ) of how Alice can access Bob's resource using a hidden credential. Suppose Bob's resource M can be accessed only by a student. Alice has a student credential cred, i.e., cred:nym ¼ Alice and cred:attr ¼ student. To access M, Alice sends her username Alice to Bob. Bob responds with IðM; Alice k studentÞ. Alice uses her credential cred to decrypt IðM; Alice k studentÞ and obtains M. Bob does not learn whether Alice possesses a student credential from the above interaction.
Review of Other Building Blocks
Scrambled Circuit Evaluation. There are two parties in scrambled circuit evaluation, one is a generator of a scrambled circuit and the other is an evaluator. Let x be the evaluator's input, y be the generator's input, and f : f0; 1g Ã Â f0; 1g Ã ! f0; 1g Ã be a function known to both parties. The goal of the scrambled circuit evaluation is for the two parties to securely compute fðx; yÞ without the generator learning x or the evaluator learning y. The generator creates a scrambled circuit where each wire of the circuit has two encodings (one for each possible value of the wire) and the evaluator learns only one encoding per wire and, thus, the intermediate results are oblivious to the evaluator. The generator creates gate information that allows the evaluator to obtain the encoding of a gate's output wire when given the encoding for each of the gate's input wires. Yao's original scheme [35] was secure only in the passive model (where the participants follow the protocol) and, recently, there has been an implementation of this protocol [23] . Also, Katz and Ostrovsky introduced a scheme that is secure in the malicious model that requires only five rounds of interaction [19] . We discuss this in more detail in Appendix A. Homomorphic Encryption. A cryptographic scheme is said to be homomorphic if, for its encryption function E, the following holds: EðxÞ Ã EðyÞ ¼ Eðx þ yÞ. Some homomorphic schemes are described in [11] , [26] , [25] . A homomorphic encryption scheme is semantically secure if EðxÞ reveals no information about x; hence, from a pair ðEðxÞ; EðyÞÞ, it is computationally infeasible to distinguish between the case x 6 ¼ y and x ¼ y.
Symmetric Key Encryption. We use Enc to denote the encryption algorithm of a symmetric key encryption scheme (such as AES [10] ) and Dec to denote the corresponding decryption algorithm.
Oblivious Transfer. We use chosen 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT) [13] , [16] [2] and Naor and Pinkas [24] .
Set Intersection. Freedman et al. [14] introduced an elegant scheme for computing the intersection of two k element sets with only OðkÞ communication and Oðk ln ln kÞ modular exponentiations. In this paper, we use a simple modification of their result. We define a primitive SetIntðx; S; E A Þ, where Bob provides an element x and Alice provides a set S with n elements and a semantically secure homomorphic encryption system E A . The output of the protocol is that Bob learns E A ðyÞ where y is 0 if and only if x 2 S and is otherwise a random value. This primitive can be easily defined from the protocols in [14] , requires a single message from Alice to Bob with Oð k S kÞ communication (where is the size of the security parameter), and is secure against a malicious Alice.
OUR PROTOCOLS
There are two primary phases in our protocols: 1) a credential hiding phase and 2) a blinded policy evaluation phase. During the credential hiding phase, Alice and Bob engage in a protocol that in some way (to be specified later) hides which credentials Bob's policy requires. During the blinded policy evaluation, if Alice satisfies Bob's policy, then she learns the requested message and, otherwise, she learns nothing. We now describe each phase in more detail:
. Credential Hiding Phase: Suppose Bob's policy contains n attributes attr 1 ; . . . ; attr n . At the end of this phase, Alice has a set of values ' 1 ; . . . ; ' n (i.e., one for each attribute), where ' i 2 fr i ½0; r i ½1g and r i ½0; r i ½1 are random values generated by Bob. These values will either be encryption keys or seeds for a pseudorandom generator that can produce such keys. Furthermore, the value of ' i is subject to the following constraints: 
; . . . ; x n Þ ¼ 1.
Credential Hiding Phase
In this section, we introduce three protocols for the credential hiding phase; we describe the input and output for this phase below:
Input. Bob has a policy P relative to set of attributes attr 1 ; . . . ; attr n and, for each attribute attr i , Bob has two random values, r i ½0 and r i ½1. Alice has a set of credentials cred 1 ; . . . ; cred m .
Output. Alice learns a value ' i for each attribute attr i , where ' i ¼ r i ½1 if and only if there exists a cred j , 1 j m, in her credential set such that cred j :attr ¼ attr i , and ' i is r i ½0 otherwise. Recall that a crucial element of this protocol is that Alice learns exactly one value for each attribute.
There is an inherent security/communication complexity trade-off for these protocols. We denote the number of attributes in Bob's policy by n, the number of credentials Alice possesses by m, and a security parameter by . Note that Alice can input some dummy credentials to disguise her actual number of credentials and, analogously, Bob can add dummy attributes to hide the size of the actual policy. The protocols can be summarized as follows:
1. Protocol 1 (Section 3.1.1): In this protocol, it is assumed that Bob is willing to reveal to Alice a superset of the attributes in his policy (he chooses this superset and can make it large enough to achieve a "hiding in a crowd" effect that suits him). While this is not acceptable for all applications, there are many cases where Alice could guess with high probability the set of attributes in Bob's policy before the protocol and, in such cases, this protocol may be acceptable to Bob. Example 2 gives a scenario where Bob is willing to reveal a superset of attributes in his policy. The communication complexity of this protocol is OðnÞ and it requires three rounds of interaction. 2. Protocol 2 (Section 3.1.2): Unlike Protocol 1, this protocol does not assume that Bob is willing to reveal a superset of the attributes in his policy. In this protocol, Bob learns the value m and Alice learns: a) the value n and b) the number of attributes in Bob's policy that she satisfies (she does not know which of her credentials are responsible for this). Example 2. An online auto insurance company gives a special promotion to those who are married and have good credit history. The policy for this special promotion is married^good credit. The insurance company may publish a superset of attributes that the policies may contain such as age, gender, marital status, credit history, number of accidents in the last three years, state of residence, etc. The actual promotion policy contains only a small subset of the published attributes. The auto insurance company may treat the superset of the attributes as nonsensitive information, but treat the attributes used in the policy as well as the policy structure as private information. The insurance company does not want its competitors to know the content of the policy as it is a commercial secret.
Protocol CHP 1
This protocol assumes that Bob is willing to reveal to Alice a superset of the attributes in his policy. This is the most efficient of the credential hiding phase protocols. Protocol. Step 2) and sets the result as her output and, otherwise, she sets her output to be r i ½0. Complexity Analysis. For each attribute, the protocol requires a single encryption to be sent between Alice and Bob as well as the descriptions C i (which we assume are of size Oð1Þ) and a single chosen 1-out-of-2 OT. Thus, the communication complexity is OðnÞ. The OT can be bootstrapped with the first step and, thus, this protocol requires only three rounds of interaction.
For each attribute
Intuition. The intuition of this protocol is that Alice will learn k i iff she has attr i . This is because this value is encrypted with IBE using attr i as the key. Furthermore, without k i , the value Encðr i ½1; k i Þ reveals nothing (in a computational sense). Thus, Alice will learn r i ½1 iff she has attr i . Now, due to the nature of the OT, Alice will learn at most one of the values r i ½0 or Encðr i ½1; k i Þ.
Protocol CHP 2
In this protocol, Bob does not reveal to Alice a superset of the attributes in his policy, but Alice learns how many, but not which, attributes she satisfies in Bob's policy. Clearly, if Bob pads his list with superfluous credentials, as in Protocol 1, this reveals less information to Alice.
Protocol.
1. For each attribute attr i , Bob generates two random keys, k i ½0 and k i ½1, and a public marker q, where q could be specified beforehand and is of length , the length of the security parameter. Intuition. The set of values f i;1 ; . . . ; i;m g will contain k i ½0 iff Alice has attr i . This is due to the IBE encryption of k i ½0. In the set intersection protocol, Bob will learn E A ð0Þ if Alice has attr i and he will learn E A ðr 1 Þ for some random value r 1 otherwise. Since E A is semantically secure, Bob will not learn which value he has received. However, the value i will be E A ðk i ½1Þ iff Alice has attr i ; otherwise, it will be E A ðr 2 Þ for some random value r 2 . Thus, Alice will learn k i ½1 iff she has attr i . In
Step 3 of the protocol, Alice will learn if a specific value is a correct key, but, since the values were permuted by Bob earlier, she does not learn which credential this corresponds to. The rest of the intuition is identical to the previous protocol except that k i ½1 now plays the role of k i .
Protocol CHP 3
This protocol protects which attributes are in Bob's policy more than the previous protocols in that Alice does not learn how many credentials she has that match with the attributes in Bob's policy. As stated earlier, this protocol requires more communication and computation than the previous protocols. It also uses Scrambled Circuit Evaluation extensively (see Appendix A). Protocol. Intuition. The values are identical to the previous protocol. However, in this protocol, Alice and Bob will use SCE (where Alice is the evaluator) to reveal the outcome. Now, a property of SCE is that the evaluator will learn at most one encoding per wire and the evaluator does not learn which encoding (i.e., 0 or 1) that it received. Thus, Alice will learn either r i ½0 or r 1 ½1 but not both and she will not know which of them she has received. Furthermore, since Bob constructs the circuit, she will learn r 1 ½1 iff her value i is equal to Bob's value k i ½1. Therefore, she will learn r i ½1 iff she has attr i .
Blinded Policy Evaluation Phase
In this section, we outline two protocols for blinded policy evaluation. The first protocol requires Oð2 n Þ communication for a policy with n attributes and the second requires a communication polynomial in n. However, the first protocol is for arbitrary functions and the second protocol is for a special class of functions that are useful in expressing policies. We formally define the input and output for this phase below. In the input and output description, we use pðx 1 ; . . . ; x n Þ to denote a policy. Recall that, given a policy P on a set of credentials C, P ðCÞ ¼ pðx 1 ; . . . ; x n Þ, where x i ¼ 1 if there is a credential in C that matches with cred i in policy P and x i ¼ 0 otherwise.
Input. Bob has a policy p : f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g, several pairs of values fr 1 ½0; r 1 ½1g; . . . ; fr n ½0; r n ½1g, and a message M. Alice has n values ' 1 ; . . . ; ' n , where ' i 2 fr i ½0; r i ½1g.
Output. Alice learns M if and only if pð' 1 ¼ ? r 1 ½1; . . . ; ' n ¼ ? r n ½1Þ ¼ 1 and learns nothing otherwise.
Arbitrary Policies
Recall that, after the previous phase, Alice has a set of values ' 1 ; . . . ; ' n , where each of these is one of two keys 3 that Bob generated, i.e., ' i is either r i ½0 if Alice does not possess attribute attr i and is r i ½1 if Alice does possess attribute attr i .
1.
For each binary string ¼ x 1 x 2 . . . x n 2 f0; 1g n , Bob generates a value x 1 x 2 ...x n along with a public marker, q, where q is of length , the length of the security parameter. There are two cases for such a value:
. pðx 1 ; . . . ; x n Þ ¼ 1:
. pðx 1 ; . . . ; x n Þ ¼ 0:
..x n is chosen to be a random value indistinguishable from an encryption with Enc. Bob randomly permutes the values and sends them to Alice, along with q, and EncðM; kÞ. 2. Alice computes k 0 ¼ L n i¼1 ' i and then computes Decð; k 0 Þ for each value. If she finds q, then she uses this value to obtain M. Complexity Analysis. Note that the communication complexity of the above scheme is Oð2 n Þ and, thus, is intractable for large policies. However, any computable policy function can be supported with such a scheme and this is impossible with polynomial computation. 4 In the following section, we look at a class of policies that can be computed with polynomial communication.
Intuition. The above is secure since Alice only knows one value for each of the attributes. Assuming a strong encryption system, Alice cannot deduce information about other keys given the encrypted messages.
Oblivious Circuit Policies
Typically, with Scrambled Circuit Evaluation (see Appendix A) during the construction of a scrambled circuit, the gates are constructed for some publicly defined function f; when the computation must be verified (i.e., in the presence of malicious adversaries), it is required that the generator of the circuit prove to the evaluator that the circuit is well-formed (i.e., that it computes f).
However, there are cases where it is useful not to have the function publicly defined, especially when the function is private (as is the case with the application in this exposition). In this case, the construction can easily be modified to use oblivious gates, where the evaluator does not know the function that each gate computes.
1. Bob constructs a circuit C that computes his policy (several "useful circuits" are described below) that uses the r i values as the input encodings and that has an output wire with two encodings: k and some other random value. He sends the encodings of the circuit's gates to Alice (note that she already has input encodings) along with EncðM; kÞ. 2. Alice evaluates the circuit and then tries to decrypt the message with the value she computes for the output wire of the circuit. We now give several examples of such oblivious circuits:
1. A binary tree of oblivious gates could be used to compute several common types of policies, including: conjunction (does Alice have all of the attributes?), disjunction (does Alice have at least one of the attributes?), conjunction/disjunction of a subset (does Alice have all (one of) of a subset of the attributes), and other policies. Note that the size of this circuit is OðnÞ. 2. An addition circuit followed by a comparison circuit would allow for computation of a threshold based function (i.e., "does Alice have at least four of the credentials"). This could easily be modified to support policies that require a threshold number of attributes for a subset of the attributes. Note that the size of the circuit is OðnÞ. 3. By having one instance of each of the above, combined with a single oblivious gate, it is possible to have policies that are combinations of: conjunction, disjunction, and threshold-based. Note that the circuit size is still OðnÞ. 4. More complex policies can be represented by combining several of the above-defined oblivious circuits together and then connecting them with other circuits. Of course, when this is done, the structure of the policy is revealed slightly (as the topography of the circuit is revealed). However, the structure is at a high level and the individual pieces of the policy are hidden (thus, the evaluator does not learn things like whether the binary tree being used is for conjunction/disjunction, the thresholds that values are being compared to, and which attributes are being used). 5. Another option is to use a universal circuit, as described by Valiant [30] . Recall that a universal circuit for a specific size s and depth d is a circuit that can be used to evaluate any circuit with these dimensions. Furthermore, there is such a universal circuit of size Oðds log sÞ and depth Oðd log sÞ. Thus, when such a universal circuit is used, it could represent any circuit of a certain size and depth.
Clearly, a large class of useful policies can be used with this technique and, while arbitrary functions cannot be computed, the communication requirements are polynomial in the number of attributes in Bob's policy.
Protocol Summary
In summary, there are two primary phases in our protocols: 1) a credential hiding phase and 2) a blinded policy evaluation phase. For the credential hiding phase, we gave three protocols that have a constant number of rounds and respective communication complexities: OðnÞ, OðmnÞ, and Oð 2 mnÞ. Furthermore, we gave two protocols for computing the blinded policy evaluation phase: 1) for arbitrary policies (using exponential communication) and 2) a limited, but useful, class of policies that can be computed with polynomial communication. In the next section, we discuss the security of our protocols in more detail.
SECURITY PROOFS
We begin by defining our security model (Section 4.1) and then prove that our system is secure in that model.
Security Definitions
In this section, we discuss our security model, which is that of [7] , [16] . At a high level, a protocol securely implements a function f if the information that can be learned by engaging in the protocol could be learned in an ideal implementation of the protocol where the functionality was provided by a trusted oracle. For more details, we refer the reader to [7] , [16] . Throughout this paper, we assume that the adversary is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, hence, the security of our problem is defined in a "computationally infeasible" sense. Having protocols that leak nothing other than what can be computed by the input and output alone are enough in Bob's case, but there are further restrictions on Alice. We must also show that Alice gets the message iff she satisfies Bob's policy.
Composition Theorem. While it is not always true that two secure protocols can be composed to create another secure protocol, the work in [7] gave conditions where composition is valid. If a protocol Å 0 securely implements g by making calls to trusted oracles (i.e., a trusted third party) for functions f 1 ; . . . ; f n , then the protocol Å that replaces the calls to the oracles by secure implementations of f 1 ; . . . ; f n will securely implement g. This composition theorem allows us to prove that many complex protocols are secure. There are composition theorems for semi-honest adversaries, malicious adversaries, and adaptive adversaries.
Concurrent Execution. There has been a large amount of work on developing protocols that are secure even if they are run in parallel with many other protocols, where the participants can be different in each protocol. While it has been shown that this is impossible for two-party computation, it was shown by [8] that, in the Common Reference String Model (i.e., where each party has a string common to all) that this is achievable. Of course, this model is unrealistic in many environments since the parties would have to agree on such a string beforehand and, so, no new parties could be added. Our protocols do not address such concerns, but it may be possible to extend our protocols with these techniques.
Assumptions/Security of Building Blocks
In this section, we introduce our assumptions about the security of various building blocks.
1. Strong Chooser OT. We assume the existence of an OT scheme where the chooser receives information about at most one value. 2. Strong Sender OT. We assume the existence of an OT scheme where the sender receives no (in a computational sense) information about which value the chooser picked. 3. Strong Evaluator SCE. We assume that Yao's Scrambled Circuit Evaluation has the following property: Assuming that the generator is honest, then a malicious evaluator will learn at most one encoding per wire for the circuit. This result assumes the Strong Chooser OT property. 4. Secure Set Intersection. We assume there exists a set intersection protocol SetIntðx B ; S A ; E A Þ, where Bob inputs a value x B and Alice inputs a set S A and a semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme E A . In this protocol, Bob will learn a value E A ðÞ, where will be 0 iff Alice's set S A contains x B and, otherwis,e will be a value that is uniformly distributed over the base of the homomorphic scheme that Alice has no information about. It is worth pointing out that such a protocol easily follows from [14] .
Proof of Credential Hiding Phase
We first prove that the protocols correctly implement input and output requirements given for the credential hiding phase (Section 3.1).
Theorem 1. For each attribute, Alice can learn at most one value r i ½0 or r i ½1.
Proof. For protocols CHP 1 and CHP 2, the only time that these values are used is in the last step of the protocol (i.e., the oblivious transfer). By the Strong Chooser OT property, the chooser (i.e., Alice) learns information about at most one value. This theorem holds for protocol CHP 3 because of the Strong Evaluator SCE property because this property implies that the evaluator (i.e., Alice) learns at most one encoding for the output wire of the circuit, which is the only place in the protocol where the values in question are used. t u Theorem 2. For each attribute attr i , Alice can learn r i ½1 iff she has attr i .
Proof. We first prove this theorem for protocol CHP 1. Suppose Alice can obtain r i ½1 with nonnegligible probability. Bob only uses r i ½1 in the value Encðr i ½1; k i Þ and, so, Alice must be able to learn k i with nonnegligible probability. However, the only other place where k i is used is in Iðk i ; nym k attr i Þ and, since Alice can learn k i with nonnegligible probability, she must be able to invert Iðk i ; nym k attr i Þ with nonnegligible probability. Thus, this implies that she must have the private key corresponding to nym k attr i , which implies that she has attr i . We now prove this theorem for protocol CHP 2. Again suppose Alice can obtain r i ½1 with nonnegligible probability. As it does not affect the correctness of the proof, we ignore the permutation in Step 2 of the protocol. Bob uses r i ½1 only in the value Encðr i ½1; k i ½1Þ and, so, Alice must be able to learn k i ½1 with nonnegligible probability. However, for Alice to learn any information about k i ½1, the value i must be 0 (if it is a randomly chosen value, then i reveals no information about k i ½1). Thus, by the Secure Set Intersection property, Alice must be able to have a set of values i;1 ; . . . ; i;m that contains k i ½0 with nonnegligible probability, but this implies that Alice knows k i ½0 with nonnegligible probability. The rest of the proof is identical to end of the last case.
Finally, we prove this theorem for protocol CHP 3. Since Bob generated the circuit in Step 3 of the protocol, Alice will only obtain r i ½1 iff her value i is equal to k i ½1. And, thus, if Alice can learn r i ½1 with nonnegligible probability, then she can learn k i ½1 with nonnegligible probability. The rest of the proof is identical to the end of the last case. t u
We now prove that a malicious Alice or malicious Bob does not learn additional information about the other party's private input from each of the CHP protocols. Proof. The second part of the theorem is trivial since Bob's only communication from Alice is from the OT protocol, which reveals no information to Bob by the Strong Sender OT property. The first part is almost as trivial because the only information about Bob's policy used in this protocol is a superset of the attributes in his policy, but this is exactly the information that Alice learns. t u Theorem 4. In protocol CHP 2, Alice learns how many attributes that she has in Bob's policy and Bob learns only the number of credentials that Alice uses.
Proof. In Step 1, Bob sends to Alice Iðk i ½0; nym k attr i Þ for each attribute in his policy. Since k i ½0 is a randomly chosen value, a correct decryption is indistinguishable from an incorrect decryption (assuming that decryption in IBE with the wrong key is a pseudorandom function). Thus, this first step reveals no information to Alice about which credentials are in Bob's policy. After Step 2, Bob sends to Alice in a permuted order a set of ordered pairs of the form ð j ; Encðq; k j ½1ÞÞ, where j ¼ E A ðk j ½1Þ iff Alice has this attribute. From this information, Alice clearly learns when she has an attribute in Bob's policy, but the permuted order prevents her from learning which of her attributes is responsible for this. Finally, Alice sees the interaction from the OT protocol, but, since Bob's policy does not affect his input into this protocol, this reveals no information about his policy. We now show the second part of the theorem. Bob's only communication from Alice is the set intersection protocol and the OT protocol. The first part of this is a set of values encrypted with a semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme (which reveals no information to Bob by definition of semantic security) and the second set of values reveals nothing by the Strong Sender OT property. t u Theorem 5. In protocol CHP 3, Alice learns how many attributes are in Bob's policy and Bob learns only the number of credentials that Alice uses.
Proof. This proof is very similar to that of the last case; we only highlight the differences. The set of values 1 ; . . . ; n is given to Alice. By the Secure Set Intersection property, these values will either be E A ðk i ½1Þ or E A ðr i þ k i ½1Þ, where r i is a uniformly chosen value. However, since k i ½1 is a uniformly chosen value, these cases are indistinguishable. Her only other interaction is from being the evaluator in SCE, but, by the Secure Evaluator SCE property, she will learn at most one encoding for the output wire and, since the encodings are both randomly chosen values, she will not learn when she has an attribute. We now show the second part of the theorem. The difference between this protocol and the last protocol is that Bob sees the communication from the Scrambled Circuit Evaluation, but this is just several OT protocols which reveal no information to him about Alice's values. t u
Proof of Blinded Policy Evaluation
As both implementations are just SCE with the first protocol having a single n-ary gate and the second protocol revealing a topology of a circuit but hiding the values, all that needs to be shown is that Alice learns the message only when she has a set of values that correspond to satisfying the policy. As long as Alice knows only one value per input wire, then she cannot learn anything other than at most one value for the output wire. Since Bob generates the circuits to match his policy, the correctness is guaranteed. It is worth pointing out that, in the second case, the notion of policy indishtinguishability being used is that two policies are indistinguishable if and only if they can be represented by the circuit topology that is being used and they evaluate to the same value on the client's input.
Proof of Composition
We now show that the protocol is secure according to the definition presented in Problem 1.
Theorem 6. Given trusted oracles CHP and BP E, where CHP provides the Credential Hiding Phase functionality and BP E provides the Blinded Policy Evaluation functionality, the protocol is secure (in as strong of a model as the weakest of CHP and BP E).
Proof. The CHP oracle requires that Bob input n triples into the system ðattr i ; r i ½0; r i ½1Þ, that Alice learns one of Bob's r i values per tuple, and that she learns the r i ½1 only if she has a credential satisfying attr i . Now, BP E requires that Bob inputs pairs of the form ðr i ½0; r i ½1Þ and a policy P , that Alice inputs a single value from the pair r i ½x i , and that she gets M iff she P ðx 1 ; . . . ; x m Þ ¼ 1. In order to make multiple distinct probes at BP E, she must be able to learn two values from the same attribute pair, which is not possible since the CHP oracle allows Alice to learn at most one value (the values can be chosen to be from a large enough space do as to make guessing computationally infeasible). Also, she obtains the message only when she has a set of attributes that matches the policy. Up to this point, we have been informal and have not discussed the effect of the information leaked by our protocols (e.g., an upper bound on the number of attributes in the policy). As this is a fairly simple extension of the above proof, we do not give all of the details here, but this information does not give the adversary an advantage in breaking the above system.t u
CONCLUSION
We gave efficient protocols for Alice to access a resource from Bob such that Alice does not learn Bob's policy and Bob does not learn Alice's credentials. The only information Alice learns is whether she got access. Our protocols support different types of policies, from simple to arbitrarily complex. For many simple policies, our protocols require polynomial communication. However, for arbitrary policies, our protocols require communication exponential in the size of the policy.
